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Summary Quong’s influential book probably represents the most sophi-
sticated defence of Rawlsian political liberalism. This review focuses on its 
content and systematizes it by chapters, emphasizing its relevance both in 
the first part, where the author puts the liberal perfectionist position under 
critical scrutiny by advancing three major objections (regarding autonomy, 
paternalism and political legitimacy), and the second, where the author pre-
sents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism that clearly 
differs from the one presented by Rawls in several important features. The 
review also summarizes Quong’s innovative arguments regarding the nature 
of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea 
of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.
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Quong’s Liberalism without Perfection (Quong, 2011) represents one 
of the most sophisticated defences of Rawlsian political liberalism, al-
though the author’s position clearly differs from the one presented by 
Rawls in several important features. The book itself has two main ob-
jectives; first, it builds a detailed critique of liberal perfectionism, and 
second, it presents a new conception of political liberalism (i.e. internal 
conception) and defends it from various objections. 
This influential book begins with a description of the main differences 
between varieties of liberalism; he distinguishes perfectionist and anti-
perfectionist form of liberalism, as well as its comprehensive and politi-
cal form. However, Quong focuses the detailed discussion to two forms: 
comprehensive perfectionism (or liberal perfectionism), as presented 
by Raz and Wall, and political antiperfectionism (or political liberal-
ism), presented by Rawls and Larmore. Quong’s intention is first to set 
up a clear distinction between different forms of liberalism, and then to 
argue against liberal perfectionism and in favor of political liberalism.
In the following chapters Quong presents three well developed argu-
ments against liberal perfectionism. His first objection targets famous 
argument from autonomy put forward by Joseph Raz, according to 
which the best way of justifying principles of liberal toleration is by 
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appealing to the value of leading an autonomous life. Raz’s central claim 
is that liberal state can, as least sometimes, legitimately promote or dis-
courage particular ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or 
intrinsic value. Raz believes that this idea is compatible with the harm 
principle, since the liberal state can use means other than coercion (e.g. 
conferring honors, giving grants, taxing some activities or products) to 
protect autonomy and to promote valuable ways of life. Quong’s first 
objection adopts Raz’s idea that autonomous choice cannot be achieved 
unless persons are free from coercion and manipulation by others, but 
points out that, since all non-coercive policies used by a perfectionist 
liberal state are a form of a manipulation, liberal perfectionism in not 
consistent with the conception of autonomous choice Raz adopts, not 
with the perfectionist version of harm principle derived from it. 
Second argument put forward by Quong points out that liberal perfec-
tionism is paternalistic and therefore pro tanto objectionable. Though 
many perfectionists might endorse non-coercive methods to promote 
a certain way of life, Quong underlines that even non-coercive actions 
can be paternalistic when motivated by a negative judgment about the 
ability of others to lead their own lives. Paternalism is than rejected be-
cause it denies one’s moral status of free and equal citizen, and since 
even a non-coercive perfectionism is a form of paternalism, it is rejected 
on the same grounds. 
Quong’s final argument builds on A. J. Simmons’ distinction between 
the justification and legitimacy of a political institution. While justi-
fication appeals to institution’s virtues and qualities, legitimation is 
achieved only by the consent of the governed. Liberal perfectionism 
claims that states that enable citizens to lead flourishing lives are justi-
fied, and since they are justified they are also (for the same reason) le-
gitimate. It thus fails Simmons’ Challenge since it is unable to construct 
an account of state’s legitimacy without appealing to its justification. 
Unfortunately Quong does not discuss Estlund’s influential idea of nor-
mative consent that can be used by liberal perfectionist to reconstruct 
the link between justification and legitimacy. 
Having displayed three convincing arguments against liberal perfection-
ism, Quong focuses on what he sees as a far more plausible alternative, 
i.e. on political liberalism. This position is motivated by two notable ide-
as: first, a moral idea according to which states must, in order to right-
fully exercise power over citizens, be able to justify it to the citizens, and 
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second, an assumption about the existence of pluralism. Quong points 
out that we should, based on their interpretation of the second idea, dis-
tinguish two different conceptions of political liberalism. External con-
ception sees the fact of pluralism as a fact about the world to which lib-
eralism must accommodate itself (p. 138). Basic liberal principles and 
institutions must thus be justified to actual citizens in existing liberal 
societies, despite their differences. External conception of political liber-
alism recognizes that we owe public justification only to reasonable citi-
zens, but takes them in a real (non-idealized) form, drawing them from 
public political culture of existing liberal democracies. Quong admits 
that this is an important and praiseworthy goal, yet he doubts that it can 
be achieved. Furthermore, he displays two important arguments against 
this conception; it is political in the wrong way since it gives actual citi-
zens, despite prejudices they might have and irrationalities they might 
display, a normative authority over what legitimacy requires. Second ar-
gument is based on an idea that liberal society needs the support of the 
majority of citizens in order to be stable over time. However, since it is not 
clear that the majority of people endorse liberal principles for the right 
reasons, Quong concludes that the external conception fails because it 
becomes dependant on too many empirical contingencies (p. 150). 
Contrary to external conception that sees the fact of pluralism as some-
thing outside of political liberalism, internal conception understands 
pluralism as a consequence of liberalism itself. It is more modest since 
it does not aim to justify liberalism to non-liberals, but to construct 
a model of political justification for those who already endorse liberal 
values and commitments. Public justification is now owned to idealized 
(reasonable) citizens, making the internal conception safe from the em-
pirical facts of our societies. 
But why should we care about internal conception if it cannot solve nu-
merous political problems that contemporary liberal societies face? 
Quong emphasizes that the goal of the internal conception is to show 
that political liberalism can create its own support under ideal conditions, 
and thus is not incoherent or unstable (p. 158). However, he also antici-
pates the next question; why do we need a coherent theory if it does not 
address the problems we currently face? Quong points out several points 
about the value of internal conception; it shows that political liberalism 
in not a practically impossible ideal, that we should strive to bring our 
own political behavior and institutions closer to ideal conditions, and fi-
nally, it allows a stronger account of legitimacy of our political principles. 
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Having adopted the internal conception of political liberalism, in the 
next few chapters Quong displays three important objections that have 
been pressed against political liberalism. His argumentative strategy is 
to show that these objections target only the external conception of po-
litical liberalism, remaining ineffective against his own position. 
The first objection targets the traditional role of an overlapping consen-
sus; it is seen as a final stage of a full or public justification of justice. 
This traditional conception holds that a justification is not complete 
until we show that the principles within political conception can be the 
subject of an overlapping consensus amongst all the reasonable com-
prehensive doctrines that might exist under liberal conditions (p. 162). 
However, critics warn us that such idea of overlapping consensus is ei-
ther redundant to the justificatory process, playing no important role in 
the theory (since reasonable people will, by definition, endorse the po-
litical conception), or the demand for consensus might make political 
liberalism hostage to the claims of the unjust. Quong agrees that this 
objection represents as important critique of external conception of po-
litical liberalism, and claims that this traditional (external) role of an 
overlapping consensus should be modified. Instead of being a test that 
a political conception of justice must pass in order to be fully justified, 
the consensus should provide an initial common ground from which 
any attempt at public justification needs to proceed. Quong’s alterna-
tive view places overlapping consensus in the beginning, not the end, 
of political justification (p. 163). Quong also modifies the subject of the 
public reason; it is no longer a conception of justice, but the fundamen-
tal idea of a society as a fair system of social cooperation amongst free 
and equal people. This modification is necessary since public reason re-
quires citizens to have a fundamental stock of ideas they can draw on 
when they deliberate on the disagreements about justice. By modifying 
both the role and the subject of overlapping consensus Quong success-
fully dodges the first objection. 
The second objection against political liberalism focuses on an asym-
metry between disagreements over the good life, and disagreements 
over the principles of justice. Political liberalism distinguishes between 
reasonable disagreements (disagreements about good life) that back up 
the idea that claims about good life are illegitimate reasons for state ac-
tion, and (unreasonable) disagreements over justice, that back up the 
idea that state can act on reasons of justice even when many people 
do not accept these reasons. However, the problem is that reasonable 
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people disagree on principles of justice just as they disagree on con-
ceptions of good life. It seems that this asymmetric approach, though 
it plays so important role in liberal argumentation, does not seem de-
fensible (p. 192). To answer this objection, Quong introduces two differ-
ent types of reasonable disagreement: foundational disagreements are 
characterized by the fact that the participants do not share any prem-
ises which can serve as a mutually acceptable standard of justification, 
while justificatory disagreements occur when there are shared prem-
ises that can serve as a mutually acceptable standard of justification, 
but participants still disagree on certain substantive conclusions. Ar-
guing from the perspective of internal conception of political liberal-
ism, Quong concludes that disagreements about justice are, by defini-
tion, justificatory disagreements, while disagreements about good life 
represent foundational disagreements (p. 193). This distinction enables 
Quong to justify and keep the asymmetric approach. 
The third and final objection focuses on the fact that political liber-
alism does not refer to the concept of truth, but limits itself to pre-
senting political principles as reasonable. Many philosophers find this 
move disturbing, and Quong summarizes their concerns in three sepa-
rate objections. The priority question raises a serious doubt when po-
litical liberalism asks us to refrain from referring to the (whole) truth; 
why should one, when basic matters are at stake, appeal only to public 
conception of justice, and refrain from appealing to the whole truth? 
Two more objections rise from the first one; in order to answer the pri-
ority question political liberalism must admit either that there are some 
metaphysical truths that support public justification (the truth objec-
tion), or adopt certain skepticism about people’s capacity to know the 
truth about the good life (the skeptical objection). However, political 
liberalism cannot embrace either of these answers since both rely on 
controversial epistemology that political liberalism is trying to avoid. 
These three objections together form a strong argument against politi-
cal liberalism; it seems that this position lacks the persuasive power to 
convince other people, who do not accept basic liberal values and com-
mitments, to embrace them. It is clear that this objection targets the 
external conception of political liberalism. Quong can thus conclude 
that this objection misses his internal conception, since its ambition 
was never to justify liberalism to non-liberals, but instead to answer 
a question that is internal to liberal theory: what should be the struc-
ture and content of political justification amongst people who already 
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embrace certain liberal values (p. 254). Following his argumentative 
strategy based on the distinction between external and internal con-
ception of political liberalism, Quong has successfully defended his ver-
sion of political liberalism.
In the final two chapters Quong clarifies his position in detail, giving 
additional attention to the scope and structure of public reason, as well 
as to the rights of unreasonable citizens. This clarification can be ex-
tremely useful since Quong in a clear way simply places his position in 
relation to ideas and theories of other influential public reason philoso-
phers: John Rawls and Gerald Gaus. 
Having explained the idea of public reason and presented several ways 
how this idea can be defended, Quong focuses on the scope of public 
reason, i.e. to the set of political issues to which the idea is meant to ap-
ply. Unlike Rawls, who claims that the idea of public reason should be 
applied only to constitutional essentials and maters of basic justice, and 
not (or at least not necessary) to other democratic decisions, Quong ar-
gues that the idea should have a much broader scope – it should regu-
late all the political decisions in a liberal democratic society (p. 258). 
He is aware that it will not always be possible to produce a public justi-
fication of every political decision, but in principle believes that all in-
stances where citizens exercise political power over one another should 
be subject to the idea of public reason (p. 274). Quong also considers the 
structure of public reason, i.e. the way in which we can justify a politi-
cal decision. Arguing against Gaus, who claims that public justification 
can be accomplished by convergence on a political decision for different 
non-public reasons, Quong argues that the structure of public reason 
requires shared or public reasons. He develops an argument against the 
convergence view which relies on the importance of sincerity in public 
reasoning. Quong argues that, according to the convergence view, citi-
zens might use arguments they themselves do not find convincing in 
order to persuade other citizens to adopt their conclusion. Such citizens 
would not act sincerely (in fact, they would intentionally manipulate 
other citizens), and Quong worries that such behavior cannot represent 
an acceptable form of public reasoning amongst free and equal persons.
In the finishing chapter Quong discusses the position of unreasonable 
citizens. He argues that unreasonable citizens should not be exclud-
ed from the benefits of citizenship, though they are rightfully excluded 
from the constituency of public justification. Finally, he argues that the 
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state can sometimes be justified in limiting or even denying the rights 
of unreasonable citizens. Quong adopts the argument put forward by 
Rawls (unreasonable citizens threaten the stability of liberal democ-
racies), but also argues that the right claims of unreasonable citizens 
cease to be valid when they are used to pursue unreasonable objectives 
(p. 291). He concludes with an idea that the state can legitimately exer-
cise political power over unreasonable citizens, even when such citizens 
are not given arguments for the exercise of state power that they can 
find acceptable. 
Quong’s argumentation is rich and insightful; he thoroughly clarifies his 
assumptions, presents in detail both his position and the arguments put 
forward by critics, as well as of the authors that he criticizes, and re-
sourcefully anticipates many of the objections to his position. It would 
be worthwhile to engage future debates in the attempt to clarify the exact 
contribution the internal conception of political liberalism can have on 
contemporary liberal democracies, as well as to specify the implications 
of Quong’s position, from those regarding global and distributive jus-
tice to those regarding actual policy-making in liberal democratic states.
Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.
Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.
Literatura
Quong, J. (2011) Liberalism Without Perfection, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ivan Cerovac
Osvrt na knjigu Liberalizam bez savršenstva
Apstrakt
Uticajna knjiga Džonatana Kvonga verovatno predstavlja najsofisticiraniju 
odbranu Rolsovog političkog liberalizma. Ovaj pregled se usmerava na njen 
sadržaj, koga sistematizuje po poglavljima, naglašavajući istovremeno važ-
nost prvog dela, u kojem autor kritički sagledava poziciju liberalnog perfek-
cionizma i protiv nje izlaže tri uticajna prigovora (vezano uz autonomiju, 
paternalizam i političku legitimnost), kao i drugog, gde autor izlaže i brani 
posebnu verziju političkog liberalizma koja se jasno razlikuje od Rolsove u 
nekoliko važnih karakteristika. Pregled takođe sažima Kvongove inovativne 
argumente vezane uz prirodu preklapajućeg konsenzusa, strukturu politič-
kog opravdanja, ideju javnog uma i status nerazložnih osoba. 
Ključne reči: Liberalizam, perfekcionizam, javni um, preklapajući konsen-
zus, Quong, Rawls, Raz.
